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ABSTRACT—In Elonis v. United States, decided last term, the Supreme
Court vacated a conviction for online threats on the ground that the lower
court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding mens rea. In doing so,
however, the Court declined to articulate which mens rea standard would
have sustained a conviction. It is thus currently uncertain which mens rea the
government must prove when prosecuting online threats under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c). The Elonis Court discussed three potential mens rea standards; as
universal standards for online threats, each leaves something to be desired.
Fortunately, federal courts need not decide which standard is best for all
online threats. Instead, they should adopt libel law’s distinction between
public and private targets, and similarly apply a heightened mens rea
standard when the threatening speech at issue targets public figures (or
implicates “broader public issues”). It won’t always be easy, but drawing this
distinction will allow courts to achieve the best balance between freedomof-speech values and the need to prevent intense psychological harm.
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INTRODUCTION
In Elonis v. United States,1 the Supreme Court failed to decide exactly
which mens rea standard the government must prove when it prosecutes an
individual for making an online threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).2 Three
standards were in play: specific intent, recklessness, and what was
characterized as either general intent or negligence. The Court’s majority
held that the last of these is precluded, but left lower courts to face a
seemingly broad decision between the two remaining options: whether to
require the government to prove defendants threatening individuals online
were reckless regarding their choice of words, or whether they specifically
intended their words be interpreted as threats.
Part I of this Essay discusses the holding in Elonis v. United States. Part
II presents the three potential mens rea standards for online threats and shows
how each standard either over- or underprotects some online speech, and
proves unsatisfactory as a one-size-fits-all solution. Part III suggests that
instead of deciding which standard is best for all online threats, lower courts
should adopt libel law’s distinction between public and private targets,3 and
similarly apply a heightened mens rea standard of specific intent only when
the speech at issue targets public figures.4

1

135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
See infra Part I.
3 See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
4 Distinguishing between “private” and “public” is more art than science, but, like in the libel context,
courts will develop precedent based on individual facts. See Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public
Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 82 (2005) (“In spite
of the complexities involved in making judicial assessments of public or private figure status, the Supreme
Court’s commitment to the public figure doctrine has remained unwavering for over 30 years.” (footnote
omitted)). For a brief discussion of the basic framework for making this determination, see infra notes
17–18 and accompanying text.
2
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Distinguishing between threats against public and private figures, and
tailoring mens rea accordingly, is the best approach in light of core First
Amendment principles. A Facebook post containing violent language about
one’s elected representative implicates free speech values in a way that an
otherwise similarly threatening post targeting one’s ex-wife does not. It will
not always be easy, but drawing this distinction will allow courts to achieve
the best balance between freedom of speech values and the need to prevent
intense psychological harm.

I. ELONIS V. UNITED STATES
18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the statute at issue in Elonis, prohibits
“transmit[ting] in interstate . . . commerce any communication
containing . . . any threat to injure the person of another.”5 Anthony Elonis
was charged under this statute for threatening others online via several
violently worded Facebook posts referencing various individuals—his exwife, law enforcement officers, and schoolchildren.6 The court instructed
Elonis’s jury that the Government must prove a reasonable listener would
have perceived his posts as a “serious expression of an intention to inflict
bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”7 The court rejected Elonis’s
request for an instruction that would have required the Government to prove
Elonis specifically intended to threaten his targets.8 This denial allowed the
Government to discount Elonis’s testimony during trial—during which he
claimed the posts were some mixture of art and therapy9—and argue in
closing “it doesn’t matter what [Elonis] thinks.”10 He was convicted on four
counts and acquitted of one.11 On appeal, he argued the given instruction was
insufficient under both the statute and the First Amendment.12
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a seven-Justice majority, reversed
Elonis’s convictions, holding that the given jury instruction, which he
questionably characterized as requiring only negligence,13 was insufficient to

5

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–07 (providing details of the Facebook posts relating to Elonis’s
indictment).
7 Id. at 2007 (quoting jury instructions).
8 Id.
9 See id. at 2005–06.
10 Id. at 2007.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 2004.
13 Chief Justice Roberts characterizes it as negligence-based because it uses a reasonable actor, like
traditional negligence determinations, id. at 2011, but the standard is only used to determine whether the
speech is a threat, not to determine anything with respect to the speaker’s actions (e.g., if they were
unreasonable). In other contexts (e.g., obscenity, fighting words) the standard is objective, yet survives
6
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sustain a conviction under the statute. The Court declined to articulate which
mens rea standard was required, leaving an open question, both on remand
in Elonis’s case and more generally for all prosecutions of online threats
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c): what mens rea standard applies to those who
threaten others online?

II. MENS REA MATTERS: THREE UNSATISFACTORY
UNIVERSAL STANDARDS
There are three potential mens rea standards discussed in Elonis. First,
Elonis argued that the Government must prove the speaker specifically
intended to threaten his target.14 Second, Justice Thomas adopted the
Government’s position in his dissent, finding the trial court’s articulation of
a general intent standard satisfactory.15 Finally, Justice Alito, concurring in
the judgment, opined that the First Amendment requires the Government to
prove Elonis was reckless as to whether his posts constituted threats.16 As
proposed universal standards for online threats, each standard leaves
something to be desired, showing the need for the hybrid standard introduced
in Part III.
All three standards elide a distinction between online threats directed at
public figures and those directed at private individuals. Searching for a
bright-line rule separating private from public figures is quixotic, but the
Court has endorsed the following distinction:
For the most part those who attain [the status of public figure] have assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite
attention and comment.17

The prominence obtained must be “especial”: someone cannot be a
public figure whose public profile is “much like those of countless members
of his profession.”18 The difference between public and private figures
affects the First Amendment calculus: the target’s identity can serve as a

First Amendment scrutiny and is not characterized as merely negligence. See id. at 2027 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
14 See id. at 2012 (majority opinion) (stating Elonis opposed recklessness standard at oral argument).
15 Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2015–16 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 345 (1974)).
18 Id. at 135.
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useful proxy for whether the speech attacking him or her has broader
significance. This follows from the understanding that violent-sounding
words directed against a public figure, although expressed in threatening
language, may in fact communicate some inchoate political idea with
broader significance, a notion with which other people can agree or disagree.
(As will be discussed in Part II.C, libel law relies on this distinction,
imposing a heightened mens rea standard when the target of the libel is a
public figure.)

A. Specific Intent
The most defendant-friendly standard would require proof that the
speaker specifically intended to threaten his target. In its amicus brief, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) explained: the Internet is the
quintessential public forum, and as a medium its speech is “often
abbreviated, idiosyncratic, decontextualized, and ambiguous . . . [subjecting
it] to multiple interpretations,”19 therefore courts must “ensure adequate
breathing room” for “core political, artistic, and ideological speech.”20
A specific intent requirement, however, would overprotect threats
directed at private targets, which have negligible First Amendment value.
The ACLU’s arguments are not terribly persuasive as applied to posts like
Elonis’s, which he asserts were either artistic or therapeutic;21 Justice Alito
is correct that a “fig leaf of artistic expression cannot convert such hurtful,
valueless threats into protected speech.”22 That Elonis targeted private
individuals against whom he had personal grudges23 means “‘[t]here is no
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas’; and ‘the threat of liability’
19 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6,
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4215752.
20 Id. at 5. See generally Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The
Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 217 (discussing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003),
and stating “both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Black majority (and, perhaps, the Black
dissenters as well) believed that the First Amendment imposed upon Virginia a requirement that the
threatener have specifically intended to intimidate”); Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue
of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225 (2006).
21 See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–06 (majority opinion).
22 Id. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Obscenity law also embraces an
objective definition of art. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (holding work that
“appeals to the prurient interest, . . . describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct[,] . . . [and
that], taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” can be prohibited
consistent with the First Amendment).
23 Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (noting “no pre-existing relationship or conflict
between [the speaker] and [the target of the speech] that might suggest [the speaker’s] speech on public
matters was intended to mask an attack on [the target] over a private matter”). The schoolchildren are an
exception, as he had never met them, but his threat did not carry any detectable political message.
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does not pose the risk of a ‘reaction of self-censorship’ on matters of public
import.”24

B. General Intent
The Government, and Justice Thomas, took the opposite position on the
proposed mens-rea spectrum, arguing—as most Courts of Appeals weighing
in have25—that First Amendment concerns are sufficiently addressed by the
objective definition of “threat.” This definition, in the view of these
proponents, adequately protects the speaker from being silenced by easily
offended listeners.26 Thus, under the Government’s position, the instruction
at issue in Elonis, whether characterized as requiring proof of general intent
or negligence, should have been permissible, especially in light of the
extensive harm caused by online threats.27 The damage to victims, including
long-lasting psychological harm, does not depend on the speaker’s state of
mind.28 Online threats also chill speech of both their targets and those who
remain silent to avoid a similar fate.29 In-person threats also chill speech of
their targets, but the public nature of many online threats suggests their
chilling effect on third-party observers is likely stronger than their offline
counterparts. More broadly, of what value are posts reasonably conveying a
serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of
an individual? Note that the Government’s concerns apply equally to threats
targeting private and public figures.
This approach has considerable appeal, especially as applied to private
threats like Elonis’s. However, as a proposed universal standard that would
apply to threats against public figures, it is in serious tension with First
Amendment precedent, specifically the Court’s imposition of heightened
mens rea requirements for libel, both in civil and criminal contexts.30 Libel
24 Id. at 1215–16 (emphasis added) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
25 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26 See id. at 2027–28 (discussing objective definition of “fighting words” and “obscenity”; suggesting
threats should be treated similarly).
27 See generally Brief of the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 2–3, 10, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL
5013749 (describing harms to victims such as reducing “ability to sleep, eat, and work”).
28 See id.
29 See, e.g., Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Unsafety Net: How Social Media Turned Against
Women, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/the-unsafetynet-how-social-media-turned-against-women/381261
[http://perma.cc/MFQ7-H5GT]
(describing
deterrence and chilling impact).
30 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (extending to criminal prosecutions the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), rule requiring a false statement about a public official
be made with “actual malice” in order to grant civil damages).
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too has an objective element, that of the truth or falsity of the statement,31
raising the question: why protect demonstrably false statements of fact that
injure the reputation of another? The Court has answered: ensuring no
chilling of protected speech requires “breathing space” for speakers, created
by precluding liability unless speakers were negligent (private target) or
reckless (public target) with respect to the risk of falsehood.32 But, as Justice
Thomas points out, the Court has declined to accord this mens rea buffer to
speakers of fighting words or makers of obscenity, who are protected only
by those categories’ objective definitions.33 So, are online threatening
statements more like libelous ones, on the one hand, or fighting words and
obscenity, on the other?
Threats, libelous statements, and fighting words all have targets, and
obscenity does not. The identity of targets helps segregate statements into
categories more (and less) worthy of protection; because obscenity lacks this
feature, treating all of it the same makes sense. While online threats, libelous
statements, and fighting words all risk upsetting public order, the key First
Amendment distinction between these categories of speech is the nature of
the risk. In prosecuting fighting words, the government is protecting the
speaker: his words could get him beaten up.34 On the other hand, in
prosecuting libel and online threats, the government is protecting the target.35
This difference matters, because the First Amendment protects
“vehement, caustic, and . . . unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials”36 to a greater extent than those on private ones.37 In other
words, the Court has required public figures to endure harsher treatment than
private figures. Treating threatened public figures like public targets of libel
is consistent with First Amendment principles: both are subject to
(sometimes severe) psychological distress, yet the statements at issue are
sometimes indistinguishable from those truly worth protecting. With libelous
statements, the mens rea standard protects the possibility that the libelous
statement is true, though not provable. With threats, the standard should

31 See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (describing
California’s libel law).
32 See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
33 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2027–28 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
34 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (fighting words, “when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction [against the
speaker]”).
35 Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283,
290–91 (2001) (listing four rationales for prosecuting threats).
36 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasis added).
37 See infra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text.
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protect expressions of outrage against a public figure, the public figure’s
actions, or the public figure’s ideology.38
Giving wide berth to these statements ensures consistency with the
Court’s goal “to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that
we do not stifle public debate.”39 Note that this analysis might not extend to
face-to-face threats, at least not to those made in private. (It does not even
properly include all “online threats,” but only publicly viewable ones. Even
on social media there are private channels of communication: a threatening
Direct Message on Twitter, even one directed at a public figure, does not
merit protection even if an identically worded one in a publicly viewable
tweet would.40 Threats made through the latter avenues more closely
resemble face-to-face threats and similarly do not merit a heightened level
of protection.)
Public, online threats raise First Amendment issues. Therefore, even if
an objective definition adequately protects the speech of online bullies who
target private individuals, this standard (and its lack of a recklessness mens
rea requirement) underprotects the words of those openly attacking public
targets.

C. Recklessness
Between the defendant’s specific-intent and Justice Thomas’s generalintent standards, Justice Alito charts a middle course, advocating for a
recklessness requirement. He asserts that “recklessness regarding a risk of
serious harm is wrongful conduct,”41 and that this standard will not result in
wrongfully convicting someone for protected First Amendment expression.42
In finding it provides “adequate breathing space” in the threat context,
Justice Alito invokes New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, yet elides its crucial
distinction43: the First Amendment requires public officials to demonstrate a
speaker’s recklessness before they can recover damages for statements made
“relating to [their] official conduct.”44 Ten years after New York Times, the
38

See infra Part III (describing threats as potential ideas in more detail).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added).
40 See, e.g., About Direct Messages, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14606
[http://perma.cc/CFH3-CYQR] (stating Twitter users can “use Direct Messages to have private
conversations with [other] Twitter users about Tweets and other content”). A similar dichotomy exists
with in-person statements: compare someone encountering a Senator on a cul-de-sac and threatening her,
with that same person yelling those same words at her at a populated rally for her reelection.
41 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2015 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
42 See id. at 2016.
43 Id. at 2017 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)).
44 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.
39
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Court held that, with respect to statements made about private individuals,
the First Amendment imposed only a negligence standard on libel suits.45
Justice Alito also relies on46 Garrison v. Louisiana, which extended the
reasoning of New York Times to criminal prosecutions,47 but that case’s
holding and reasoning, like in New York Times, depended on statements
targeting public figures. In Garrison, the Court rejected the lower court’s
conclusion that the defendant’s statement constituted “purely private
defamation,”48 suggesting, consistent with civil libel case law, that a lesser
standard would have applied had it been so. Justice Alito would collapse this
distinction as applied to online threats, suggesting the justification for it no
longer applies, or does not apply to online threats. But as this Part has argued,
and as Part III will further demonstrate, it does.

III. A HYBRID APPROACH
Courts can more precisely balance the First Amendment interests of the
speaker against the need to protect the target from threats of harm by using
a two-part approach. This approach should focus on the identity of the target
and impose a higher mens rea standard when the target is a public figure.
This Part will explain why this is a distinction with a difference, albeit only
from society’s—and not the target of the threat’s—perspective. The harm to
the threat’s target is the same, but threats directed at public figures more
likely involve public issues, and as such deserve some First Amendment
protection, despite the serious harm to innocent victims threats predictably
cause.49
Angry online speech attacking public figures is more likely to convey
an idea on important public issues than that targeting private individuals;
thus, it is more deserving of First Amendment protection. The Court has
recognized that “speech concerning public affairs is more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government.”50 In the context of threats,
this means that there is a greater risk a “threat” against a public official is not
solely a “threat,” but also an entry into the marketplace of ideas (albeit a
frightening one). Someone writing something threatening about President
Barack Obama online, especially if the two have never met, might very well
be expressing some rudimentary political opposition; someone threatening

45
46
47
48
49
50

Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
Id. at 76.
Cf. supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (describing harm from online threats).
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75.
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his ex-wife is almost certainly not.51 The words of the threat are more worthy
of Constitutional protection in the first instance than in the second, and using
the identity of the target allows courts to distinguish between the two without
evaluating the content of the speech.
For better or worse, the First Amendment requires that public figures
withstand more severe verbal and written abuse than private individuals.
That speech targets a public figure is a sufficient but not necessary condition
for bestowing First Amendment protection on it. Even if the target is a
private one, if speech has even a faint political or ideological bent to it, the
First Amendment will shield it. For example, the funeral for Marine Matthew
Snyder became a target for the Westboro Baptist Church, which stirred up
publicity and then picketed his funeral (standing about 250 feet outside of
it), singing hateful songs throughout.52 The Court, while acknowledging that
Westboro’s speech “is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public
discourse may be negligible,” found that it “addressed matters of public
import” and did so “on public property [and] in a peaceful manner.”53
Therefore, despite testimony that the speech caused Snyder’s father Albert
“emotional anguish [that] had resulted in severe depression and had
exacerbated pre-existing health conditions,” the speech was fully protected
by the First Amendment, precluding even civil liability.54
Threats, like libel, are exceptions to the First Amendment’s prohibition
on content-based restrictions,55 so they need not be protected in an absolute
manner like the nonthreatening and nonlibelous opinion statements of the
Westboro Baptist Church. Yet the same rationale that moved the Court to
protect hate speech in that case, the fear of “stifl[ing] public debate,”56 even
when the “debate” at issue is a one-sided screed, suggests caution when
prosecuting online threats. Remaining true to the First Amendment’s
animating principle requires mens rea protection for speakers of online
threats against public officials.

51 Cf. Kyle A. Mabe, Note, Long Live the King: United States v. Bagdasarian and the SubjectiveIntent Standard for Presidential “True Threat” Jurisprudence, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 57–58
(2013) (advocating specific intent requirement for threats against the President or presidential candidates
for this and other reasons).
52 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
53 Id. at 1220.
54 Id. at 1214, 1220.
55 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2027–28 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Obscenity law
also presents a potentially instructive analogy for the Court’s “threat” jurisprudence. See The Supreme
Court, 2014 Term — Leading Case, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 331, 336–40 (2015).
56 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
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CONCLUSION
Since Elonis held general intent insufficient for online threat
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), lower courts are left with two mens
rea options. Federal courts need not decide whether Justice Alito’s
recklessness standard or the more protective specific intent requirement
strikes a better balance for all online threats; each court should focus on the
precise threat before it and, guided by libel case law, decide whether the
target is a private individual or a public figure. After making this
determination, courts should instruct juries on recklessness when the threat
is to a private individual, and on specific intent when the defendant has
targeted a public figure.
That is not to say the Court in Elonis got it right; in fact, I think it did
not. Elonis targeted private individuals, and did not appear to raise any issues
of “public import” with his threats that would make them at all analogous to
the Westboro Baptist Church’s funeral-protest speech. As such, the analogy
to libel law would suggest an affirmance of his conviction: the objectivelistener requirement, coupled with general intent negligence, adequately
protects the limited First Amendment values at stake in his posts. His threats
against his ex-wife, among others, are no more valuable than demonstrably
false statements of fact harming the reputation of a private individual: they
both cause serious harm and do not add anything appreciable to the public
marketplace of ideas, so a negligence-type standard should be acceptable.
Following from this, online threats against public figures or threats that
implicate broader public issues should require the government to prove
recklessness on the part of the speaker.57

57 Of course, none of these First Amendment strictures restrain the private social media companies
that created the platforms for all the threatening language discussed in this Essay; they can do much more
than the government can to stop it (or at least quickly remove it). Cf., e.g., Editorial, Hate Speech on
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/opinion/misogynistspeech-on-facebook.html [http://perma.cc/9MXY-AGLW] (discussing how Facebook “belatedly moved
to further restrict hate speech that glorified violence against women” after advocacy groups gathered
petitions and alerted advertisers).
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